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On August 27, 2014, a trial court in California issued a decision that
invalidated three statutory employment protections for public school teachers
as violations of the state constitution.1  National media reported that this deci-
sion abolished tenure.2  The school reform organization that sponsored the suit
characterized the decision in Vergara v. State of California as “a historic vic-
tory.”3  In an editorial, the New York Times inveighed: “The ruling opens a
new chapter in the equal education struggle. It also underscores a shameful
problem that has cast a long shadow over the lives of children, not just in
California but in the rest of the country as well.”4
This impartial examination summarizes and analyzes the decision in terms
of its effect in California and elsewhere.5 More specifically, the succeeding sec-
1 Vergara v. State of California, No. BC484642 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014).  The court
first issued its decision as a tentative ruling on June 10, 2014; the content did not change in any
significant way in the interim.  For the tentative decision, see, e.g., http://www.documentcloud.
org/documents/1193670-tenative-vergara-decision.html.  The suit was filed on May 14, 2012.
The state’s two largest teacher unions, the California Teachers Association and the California
both of Teachers, intervened on May 2, 2013.  The trial began on January 27, 2014.  For the
full case timeline, see http://studentsmatter.org/our-case/vergara-v-california-case-status/time
line/
2 See, e.g., Michelle Chen, California Just Abolished Due Process for Public School Students,
THE NATION (June 13, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/blog/180223/california-just-
abolished-due-process-public-school-teachers; cf. Leslie C. Francis, The Teachers Unions Must
Embrace the Future, EDUC. WK. at 32 (Aug. 6, 2014) (characterizing Vergara as “overturning the
state’s laws on teacher tenure”).
3 The founder the sponsoring organization, Students Matter, is Silicon Valley entrepreneur,
David Welch. Id.  Critics also take issue with “the group’s connections to other deep-pocketed
donors, such as philanthropist Eli Broad, who has a history of butting heads with the teachers’
unions.”  Stephen Sawchuk, Teacher Protections Violated Student Rights, Calif. Judge Finds, EDUC.
WK. (June 11, 2014), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/06/11/36vergara.h33.html?tkn=
STMFXNg6fFszkHdriccexYRSXkB7cyp241cm&intc=ES. See also http://studentsmatter.org/
victory/.
4 A New Battle for Equal Education, NEW YORK TIMES, June 12, 2014, p. A30.
5 For the need for an objective analysis, see, e.g., Stephen Sawchuk, Teacher Case Raises
Stakes in Equity Fight, EDUC. WK., July 9, 2014, at 1, 22:
To a degree, the cacophony of responses greeting the decision has obfuscated the fact
that many of the implications of the lawsuit remain unclear, both in the Golden State
and nationwide.  Among the lingering questions: Will the ruling, at a slim 16 pages,
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tions of this brief overview provide 1) a summary of the decision, 2) analysis of
its legal status and effect in California, 3) projection of its legal effect in other
states, and 4) its overall impact in terms of school reform on behalf of students
in high-poverty and high-minority schools.
THE TRIAL COURT DECISION
After hearing the arguments and evidence, including the testimony of vari-
ous experts, the trial court judge ruled that each of these three statutory re-
quirements violated the California constitution: 1) the two-year probationary
period of the teacher tenure statute, 2) the super due process of three related
teacher dismissal statutes, and 3) the last-in-first-out (LIFO) provision of the
teacher reduction-in-force statute.6  The suit was filed on behalf of high-pov-
erty and high-minority schools in California.7
First, the court set forth the following legal framework for analyzing the
factual findings:
• precedents in California, including but not limited to the school finance
decision in Serrano v. Priest II,8 clearly establish that education is a funda-
mental right under the state constitution
hold up on appeal? Will California’s notoriously polarized legislature, fearful of addi-
tional litigation and bad press, consider changing the statutes at issue on its own? And
finally, will similar lawsuits elsewhere—one is already primed for introduction in New
York—be as initially successful?
6 Thus, there were six challenged statutes in total, but—due to the cluster of three dismissal
statutes for the middle category, the treatment here is organized in terms of three challenged
requirements.
7 According a critic of the decision, the nine named student plaintiffs were not entirely
minority or poor students. Alan Singer, The Case Against Teacher Tenure (Sept. 11, 2014), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/alan-singer/the-case-against-teacher-_b_5527306.html.
8 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Cal. 1976) (holding that revised school finance system that contin-
ued to result in substantial disparities in per pupil expenditures among districts violates the state
constitution by not passing the strict scrutiny/compelling justification test based on the interac-
tion of its education and equal protection clauses).  This decision is part of a line of cases
ranging from Serrano I, 96 Cal. Rptr.  601 (Cal. 1971) (holding, prior to the superseding Su-
preme Court ruling in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) with respect
to the U.S. Constitution, that the former system violated both the federal and state constitu-
tions) to Serrano III, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Ct. App. 1986), remanded on limited other issue, 253
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1989). The other cited precedent was Butt v. State of California, 15 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1992) (extending Serrano’s principal of basic educational equality to proposed closure of a
district’s schools six weeks early).
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• the equally well-settled precedent in California establish the concept of
“equal educational opportunity,” requiring strict scrutiny, i.e., compelling
justification, for substantial, appreciable disparities9
Second, as the factual fabric within this legal framework, the court arrived
at the following overall set of findings:
• competent teachers are a critical, if not the most important, factor to
student success
• conversely, grossly ineffective teachers substantially undermine the ability
of the child to succeed in school
• an estimated 1–3% of the teachers in California are grossly ineffective
(amounting to 2,750–8,250 teachers)
• high-poverty, low-performing schools have a disproportionate number of
both minority students and grossly ineffective teachers10
The court’s next set of factual findings was specific to the three statutory
requirements that the court found to be contributing factors to this dispropor-
tionate effect:
• the statutorily mandated two-year probationary period, which effectively
is more like 1.6 years due to the notice requirement, is not long enough
for an informed decision for the critical question of tenure
• the dismissal statutes’ procedures are so unwieldy11 in terms of time and
cost that districts rarely resort to termination of incompetent teachers
• the LIFO statute, which treats seniority as the sole criterion, for reduc-
tions-in-force (RIF) is distinctly different than the vast majority of state
laws, which either treat seniority as one consideration or leave the matter
to district discretion
Finally, applying the foregoing legal framework to the factual findings for
the three challenged statutory requirements, the court not only concluded that
they did not pass muster under the state constitution12 but also indirectly indi-
cated a template for revising them to survive the requisite strict scrutiny analy-
9 This strict scrutiny analysis is parallel to Fourteenth Amendment equal protection adjudi-
cation for fundamental rights or suspect classifications.
10 The court posited the issue in terms of both “all California students in general and . . .
minority and/or low income students in particular.”
11 The court characterized the dismissal statutes are providing “uber due process.”
12 Acknowledging the separation of powers among the branches of government, the court
intoned:
All this Court may do is apply constitutional principles of law to the Challenged
Statutes as it has done here, and trust the legislature to fulfill its mandated duty to
enact legislation on the issues herein discussed that passes constitutional muster, thus
providing each child in this state with a basically equal opportunity to achieve a qual-
ity education.
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sis.13  More specifically, here is the implicit prescription for each of the three
fatal flaws:
• the acceptable minimum, per the court’s comparison to other jurisdic-
tions with 3–5 year probationary periods, appears to be three or, allowing
for due notice, perhaps 3.5 years
• the constitutionally satisfactory level, per the court’s comparison to the
statutory due process accorded to California’s permanent classified em-
ployees, is a more streamlined system in terms of time and cost, though
its specific contours are not entirely clear14
13 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
14 The trial court ascribed the specific procedural rights to Skelly v. State Personnel Board,
124 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1975):
As a minimum, these preremoval safeguards must include notice of the proposed ac-
tion, the reasons therefor, a copy of the charges and materials upon which the action
is based, and the right to respond, either orally or in writing, to the authority initially
imposing discipline.
Id. at 215 (emphasis supplied).  However, this federal constitutional minimum concerns pre-
termination safeguards, which the Supreme Court subsequently addressed in Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).  Such a so-called Loudermill hearing is only “an
initial check against mistaken decisions—essentially, a determination of whether there are rea-
sonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the pro-
posed action.” Id. at 545–46.  The Loudermill Court also made clear that the rather minimal
due process requirements of such a pre-termination hearing are premised on the availability of a
more formal termination, or “post-termination,” hearing. Id. at 546.  In California, school
district permanent classified employees are statutorily entitled to:
written notice of the specific charges against him or her, a statement of the employee’s
right to a hearing on those charges, and the time within which the hearing may be
requested which shall be not less than five days after service of the notice to the
employee . . . . The burden of proof shall remain with the governing board . . . .
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 45113.  The constitutional requirement for an impartial adjudicator in
this context is relatively relaxed, with the board having the authority to be the final decision
maker.  See, e.g., Thornbrough v. W. Placer Unified Sch. Dist., 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 24 (Ct. App.
2013).  The present complicated system includes, for example, a tripartite panel. CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 44944. Such a panel is typical elsewhere only for interest arbitration, where the stakes
are the livelihood of the entire collective bargaining unit rather than the individual employee, far
exceeds not only the constitutional minimum but also the prevailing statutory standard in other
states.  In most states, the school board or a single hearing officer implements this process.  See,
e.g., Education Commission of the States, Teacher Tenure: Notification of Nonrenewal and
Hearing http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbquestRTL?rep=TT02.  A legislative compromise that
would likely fit within the boundaries that the trial court outlined would be a single California
administrative law judge with a firm, fixed time limit and/or cost limit.  For example, California
amended its dismissal legislation in June 2014 solely for teachers engaged in “egregious
misconduct,” such as criminal sex offenses, to add limitations to the extensive hearing process,
including an administrative law judge rather than a tripartite panel and a seven-month period
without exceptions. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44934.1 and 44944.  Similarly, Connecticut
recently eliminated the three-member adjudicator, while reducing the length of the proceedings,
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• the minimum, again based on the court’s discussion of contrasting treat-
ments of seniority in RIF statutes, appears to be a waiver procedure or,
more safely, reducing its level to being a factor, rather than the factor15
NEXT STAGE IN CALIFORNIA
Beating the two California teacher unions, which were intervenors in the
trial court deliberations, to the door of the appeals court, the Governor filed an
appeal on August 29, 2014.16  In the meanwhile, the trial court’s decision is in
abeyance.17
The appeal in California’s congested courts is more likely to take years
than months, especially if the state’s highest court agrees to hear this significant
issue.  For example, the appeals process for another recent school case, which
concerned whether the state’s nurse practices act prohibited school personnel
from administering injections to students with diabetes, took 4.7 years from
the filing of appeal at the intermediate level to the state supreme court’s deci-
sion.18  Although the final judicial outcome is unpredictable, an affirmance is
more likely than a reversal.  Although skeletal, the trial court judge’s factual
findings, which typically receive deference on appeal, were largely undisputed.
More vulnerable is the activist bent of his legal conclusions.  Seeing the slip-
pery slope of establishing a precedent for various other substantial and appreci-
able disparities in educational opportunity19 between the low income and
including a six-hour limit for each side’s presentation at the hearing, with extensions for good
cause. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-151(d)  [http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/ACT/PA/2012PA-00116
-R00SB-00458-PA.htm].  Providing perhaps the strongest example, New Jersey’s 2012
amendments that, inter alia, changed the adjudicator from an administrative law judge to an
arbitrator from a panel administered by the commissioner of education; required the hearing to
start within 45 days of assignment the decision issued within the next 45 days with no
extensions except those that the commissioner approves; and capped the arbitrator’s
compensation at $7500.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-17.1
15 More specifically, in light of its central position in this case, competence—sometimes
referred to in this context as “merit”—would have to be another and major factor.
16 State of California Notice of Appeal, http://studentsmatter.org/legal-filings/;  Madeline
Will, Calif. Governor Appeals Teacher-Tenure Ruling, EDUC. WK., Sept. 10, 2014.
17 Howard Blume, Bill to Speed Firing of Some Public School Teachers Advances, L.A. TIMES,
June 16, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-teacher-dismissal-bill-20140617-
story.html
18 See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Unlicensed Administration of Medication: The California Supreme
Court Decision, 29 NASN SCH. NURSE 248 (2014).
19 For example, the ACLU reportedly filed suit in May 2014 challenging the alleged dispar-
ity in instructional time between schools serving low-income and minority and other schools.
Sawchuk, supra note 5.
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minority students and other students,20 the appellate judiciary might follow
the more conservative, post-Serrano interpretation of equal protection analysis,
which requires direct or indirect evidence of discriminatory intent.21  Yet, as
recently as 1992, California’s highest court concluded that “both federal and
California decisions make clear that heightened scrutiny applies to State-main-
tained discrimination whenever the disfavored class is suspect or the disparate
treatment has a real and appreciable impact on a fundamental right or inter-
est.”22  The trial court’s equal protection analysis may also be sustained on
appeal based on alternate grounds.23 Thus, although uncertain, it would not
be surprising if the ultimate appellate outcome were an affirmance of the trial
court’s ruling.
In the meanwhile, California’s legislature has a clear opportunity to resolve
the matter by revising the challenged statutes within the trial court’s implicitly
countenanced boundaries.  Yet, the state’s complicated politics, including the
strong influence of the unions, would suggest that such a seemingly rational
resolution is unlikely.24  Successive examples of the teacher unions’ power in
favor of resisting such changes include 1) their success in helping to defeat then
Governor Schwarzenegger’s 2005 referendum to extend the teachers’ proba-
20 One of the conceptual problems that the trial court glossed over with broad strokes is
whether the disparity is in terms of students or schools and, either way, whether it limited to the
overlapping low income and minority categories.  See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S.
527 (1982).
22 Butt v. State of California, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 480, 490–91 (1992).  For the trial court’s
reliance on this extension of Serrano, see supra note 8.
23 For example, Welner has identified another possible basis for a less activist approach on
appeal based on language in the post-Serrano precedent—requiring an effect clearly below a
threshold minimum level of basic educational equality.  Valerie Strauss, A Silver Lining in the
Vergara Decision, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2014/06/11/a-silver-
lining-in-the-vergara-decision/.  For the specific language, see Butt v. State of California, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 492 (“Unless the actual quality of the district’s program, viewed as a whole, falls
fundamentally below prevailing statewide standards, no constitutional violation occurs”).  The
factual findings in Vergara would seem to show a real and appreciable effect on this prerequisite
basic level; by its norm-like definition a grossly ineffective teacher is well below the state
standard and having such a teacher for a year would seem to be at least equivalent to Butts’
qualifying loss of six weeks at the end of the school year.
24 Just as the reformers’ theories of productivity and competition are in significant part at-
tributable to a commercial model, the unions are rooted in a collective employee interest tied to
the industrial model.  The plea from a former staff member of the California Teachers Associa-
tion to change the position of both unions from an industrial to an innovative model is likely to
go unheeded.  Leslie C. Francis, The Teachers’ Unions Must Embrace the Future, EDUC. WK.,
Aug. 6, 2014, p. 32.
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tionary period from two to five years25; 2) the California Teachers’ Association
refusal to support the attempt of its local affiliate in San Jose to extend some
teacher’ probationary period for another year26; 3) the April 2014 settlement
of an earlier suit challenging the LIFO system in the Los Angeles school dis-
trict made other relatively limited changes but did not alter the fundamental
seniority standard that the suit targeted27; and 4) both teachers unions’ multi-
million-dollar support for the election of the incumbent chief state school of-
ficer, narrowly defeating the former leader of a charter school network who
tried to use Vergara as a wedge issue.28
OTHER STATES
Vergara is likely to have a ripple effect in terms of litigation in other states,
but its leverage is markedly limited.  First, it is only a trial court decision, thus
carrying negligible legal weight.  Second, even if upheld on appeal, its im-
portability to other states is restricted to the relatively few states with a simi-
larly solid state constitutional foundation, as primarily reflected in the school
finance litigation that corresponded to Serrano.29
25 Howard Blume, Schools’ Next Test is Getting Tenure Ruling to Pay Off in Class, L.A. TIMES,
June 11, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-teacher-decision-lawsuit-201406
12-story.html; Sawchuk, supra note 5, at 22.
26 Sawchuk, supra note 5, at 22.
27 Stephen Sawchuk, Los Angeles Settlement on Teacher Layoffs Ducks the Seniority Issue,
EDUC. WK. blog, Apr.9, 2014, http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/teacherbeat/2014/04/la_settle
ment_ducks_the_senior.html?qs=sawchuk.  For the intervening decision that negated the prior
consent decree based on the teacher union’s due process right, see Reed v. United Teachers Los
Angeles, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 454 (Ct. App. 2012).
28 Andrew Ujifusa, California Chief’s Win a Bright Spot for Teachers’ Unions, EDUC. WK.,
Nov. 12, 2014, at 16.
29 For an overview of the outcomes of the school finance litigation, which very considerably
but in recent years have largely moved in a defendants-favorable direction.  See, e.g., Perry A.
Zirkel, An Updated Tabular Overview of the School Finance Litigation, 45 ELA NOTES 8 (Jan.
2013) (newsletter of the Education Law Association, https://educationlaw.org).  For more de-
tailed analysis of the waves of this litigation, see, e.g., Jared S. Buszin, Beyond School Finance:
Refocusing Educational Reform Litigation to Realize the Deferred Dream of Educational Equality
and Adequacy, 62 EMORY L.J. 1613 (2013); Kristine Kiracofe, Serial and Second Generation
School Finance Litigation: 2003–2013, 299 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2014)
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In the primary tangible example to date,30 an educational reform organiza-
tion in New York31 filed suit on July 28, 2014 challenged a similar set of
statutes based on the education article of the New York state constitution.32
The resulting problem is also similar.33   However, the differences in this case
may amount to a distinction.  For example, although the named plaintiffs are
students in New York City and another urban school system34 and the com-
plaint uses New York City as its primary example, the theory of the case does
not seem to focus on the disparity in educational opportunity for low-income
and minority students.  Perhaps more significantly, the precedents in New
York are less robust than in California with respect to the state constitution; in
comparison to California’s Serrano and subsequent case law foundation of
“equal educational opportunity,35 New York’s precedents lack the leverage of
requiring a compelling justification for the challenged statutes.36  Finally, al-
30 A different reform organization in New York, which has an overlapping but not identical
agenda, filed a less well-publicized separate suit in New York on June 30, 2014.  Davids v. State
of New York, http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1212617/nyc-parents-union-class-
action-lawsuit.pdf.  This complaint expressly mentions “the watershed case in Vergara v. State of
California.” Id.  However, on September 11, 2014, a New York court combined the two
lawsuits and allowed New York’s United Federation of Teachers to enter the case as an
intervenor defendant.  Jessica Glazer, Chalkbeat NY: Two Tenure Lawsuits Are Combined, But
Not in Harmony, http://www.nycparentsunion.org/archives/1451.
31 The organization is the Partnership for Educational Justice.  For its website, see http://
www.edjustice.org/projects/new-york-lawsuit/.  For the addition of famed trial attorney David
Boies as the chair of the organization’s suit, see, e.g., Mokoto Rich, Celebrated Trial Lawyer to
Head Group Challenging Teacher Tenure, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/08/04/us/celebrated-trial-lawyer-david-boies-to-head-group-challenging-teacher-tenure.
html?_r=0
32 Wright v. State of New York, http://nylawyer.nylj.com/adgifs/decisions14/072914
summons.pdf.  Interestingly, despite the obvious impetus, the complaint does not specifically
cited the Vergara decision. Id.
33 See, e.g., KATHARINE B. STEVENS, TENURED TEACHER DISMISSAL IN NEW YORK (2014),
http://www.aei.org/papers/education/k-12/tenured-teacher-dismissal-in-new-york/ (reporting
that .0008% of New York City’s teachers were dismissed for poor performance during the
decade 1997–2007).
34 Two of the seven named plaintiffs are in the Rochester City School District. Id.
35 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
36 Compare New York Civil Liberties Union v. State, 791 N.Y.S.2d 507 (2005) (rejecting
alleged academic failures on the school level without element of district-wide sabotage), and
Paynter v. State of New York, 765 N.Y.S.2d 819 (2003) (rejecting allegations of academic failure
without element of state failure to provide minimally acceptable educational services), and Bd.
of Educ., Levittown Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 453 N.YS.2d 643 (1982) (ruling that the educa-
tion article provides for a minimum but not equal educational opportunity), with Campaign for
Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York, 769 N.Y.S.2d 106 (2003) (“CFE II”) (ruling that
plaintiffs established causation element of prima facie case that state funding system failed to
64
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though New York’s dismissal and LIFO statutes are approximately parallel to
their counterparts in California, the probationary period is three, not two
years.37
OVERALL IMPACT
Even if the appeal in Vergara ultimately affirms the trial court decision and
the California legislature revises the challenged statutes an ample accordance
with its constitutional template,38 it is not likely to come close to resolving the
appreciable and substantial disparity faced by low-income and minority stu-
dents39 for several overlapping reasons.  First, the state constitutional mini-
mum is far from the educational optimum.  For example, if California revised
its probationary period to three or four years, adopted the dismissal procedures
of its permanent classified employees or for its teachers accused of “egregious
misconduct,40 and in one way or another reduced seniority and introduced
merit into the RIF criteria,41 there may well not be a resulting significant re-
duction in the number of grossly ineffective teachers, because the time and cost
are likely to remain considerable.  In the various other states that have a com-
provide a sound basic education to New York City’s school children in violation of the education
article in the state constitution).  In a case that rejected extending CFE II to educational quality
issues more generally, see K.M. v. Hyde Park Central School District, 381 F. Supp. 2d 343, 363
n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).  At best, CFE II recognized that teaching is “the first and most important
input” for the requisite minimally sound education and that, in measuring this input, “princi-
pals’ reviews tend to conceal teacher inadequacy because principals find it difficult to fire bad
teachers and to hire better ones.” 769 N.Y.S.2d at 113.  However, the court also found various
other inputs, such as facilities and instructional equipment, as essential elements of this equation
and that for the teaching factors, the key determinant was the New York City system’s “inability
to attract and retain qualified teachers.” Id. at 114.  In a subsequent decision, New York’s
highest court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the legislature’s appropriations and capital im-
provement plan for New York City did not satisfy the remedial order in CFE II.  Campaign for
Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York, 828 N.YS.2d 235 (2006) (“CFE III”).
37 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3012(1)(a).  In other developments reflecting controversy concerning
New York’s teacher tenure policies, governor Cuomo (1) vetoed legislation that would have
temporarily shielded teachers from the effects of student testing on teacher evaluation, and (2)
urged the state board of regents to make it easier to remove “poor performing” teachers. N.Y.
Governor Aims to Flex Muscles on Education Policy, EDUC. WK., Jan. 14, 2015, at 15.
38 See supra text accompanying notes 13–15.
39 Thus, this sobering prognosis calls into question the Vergara judge’s assumption about or
meaning of “a basically equal opportunity to achieve a quality education.”  See supra note 12.
However, it is consistent with the boundaries that the primary part of his statement establishes.
40 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
41 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
65
9
Zirkel: <i> Vergara v.State of California:</i>Judicial Aboliton of Teache
Published by LAW eCommons, 2014
Loyola Public Interest Law Reporter
parable combination of less stringent procedural requirements, the length and
expense of the proceedings tends to be high.42
The second and interrelated reason is the school culture, specifically the
perceptions of school officials.43  The trial court’s Vergara decision depended
on not only the actual but also the perceived difficulties of this triad of Califor-
nia statutes.44  The evidence is considerable that in the rest of the country,
which largely has a range of less onerous procedures extending to the other
extreme of “right-to-work” states, administrators do not resort to teacher ter-
mination based on incompetence.45  For example, the U.S. Department of
Education’s National Center on Educational Statistics found that in 2010–11
the average number of tenured teachers per school districts terminated for poor
performance was less than .1%.46  Yet, contrary to the lore among the adminis-
trators,47 the law from the courts is strongly skewed in favor of school districts,
42 See, e.g., SABA BIREDA, DEVIL IN THE DETAILS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TEACHER DIS-
MISSAL LAWS (2010), http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/06/pdf/
sabateacherdismissal.pdf; New York State School Boards Association, Accountability for All
(Mar. 2007), http://www.nyssba.org/clientuploads/gr_3020a_reform.pdf
43 In this school culture, where student grade inflation is another manifestation, less than
1% of the teachers typically receive unsatisfactory summative evaluation ratings.  See, e.g.,
DANIEL WEISBERG, SUSAN SEXTON, JENNIFER MULHERN, & DAVID KEELING, THE WIDGET
EFFECT: OUR NATIONAL FAILURE TO ACKNOWLEDGE AND ACT ON DIFFERENCES IN TEACHER
EFFECTIVENESS (2009), http://tntp.org/publications/view/the-widget-effect-failure-to-act-on-
differences-in-teacher-effectiveness; see also Donald Langlois & Mary Rita Colarusso, Don’t Let
Teacher Evaluation Become an Empty Ritual, 10 EXEC. EDUC. 32 (May 1988); Pamela Tucker,
Lake Wobegon: Where All Teachers Are Competent, 11 J. PERSONNEL EVALUATION EDUC. 103
(1997).
44 Based on the testimony of a defense expert and substantial supporting evidence, the Ver-
gara opinion found that “dismissals are ‘extremely rare’ in California because administrators
believe it to be ‘impossible’ to dismiss a tenured teacher under the current system” (emphasis
added).
45 See, e.g., Brian A. Jacob, Do Principals Fire the Worst Teachers?, 33 EDUC. EVALUATION &
POL’Y ANALYSIS 403 (2011) (finding that a notable proportion of Chicago principals, including
those in the lowest performing schools, failed to resort to the more flexible dismissal procedures
under the collective bargaining agreement).
46 U.S. Department of Education, National Center on Educational Statistics, Schools and
Staffing Survey (n.d.), http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sass/tables/sas1112__2013311_d1s_.009.asp.
The corresponding figure for nonrenewal of nontenured teachers based on poor performance is
.5%. Id.  For much earlier and similar data in various states, see EDWIN M. BRIDGES & BARRY
GROVES, MANAGING THE INCOMPETENT TEACHER 16 (1990), available from the Education
Resources Information Center, Access No. ED320195.
47 See, e.g., Edwin M. Bridges, It’s Time to Get Tough with the Turkeys, 64 PRINCIPAL 20
(Jan. 1985) (identifying various common “excuses,” or “rationalizations,” among principals, in-
cluding the following: “It’s too costly,” “It’s too time-consuming,” and “You can never win.”).
Other contributing factors appear to include avoidance of conflict and lack of support.  Don L.
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thus posing a steep uphill slope against the teachers in the final judicial out-
comes of termination proceeding based on performance.48
Third, various other strategies are the relatively hidden or at least unofficial
responses to grossly incompetent teachers, such as the gamesmanship of “pass
the turkey” (i.e., inflated ratings),49 “dance of the lemons” (i.e., transfers),50
and “passing the trash” (i.e., resignation/recommendation deals).51  For exam-
ple, in a survey at a large urban school district the teacher-respondents identi-
fied the use of several strategies with incompetent teachers more frequently
Fuhr, Managing Mediocrity in the Classroom, 50 SCH. ADM’R 26 (Apr. 1993); see also Brendan P.
Menuey, Teachers’ Perceptions of Professional Incompetence, 18 J. PERSONNEL EVALUATION EDUC.
309, 311 (2005) (adding fear of staff repercussions and lack of technical skill).
48 See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Teacher Evaluation: A Case of “Loreful” Leadership? 13 PRINCIPAL
LEADERSHIP 46 (Mar. 2013); Perry A. Zirkel, Legal Boundaries for Performance Evaluation of
Public School Professional Personnel, 172 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2003).  The outcomes of the teacher
termination challenges based on alleged discrimination reflects this marked judicial deference to
school authorities.  See, e.g., Mark Paige & Perry A. Zirkel, Teacher Termination Based on Per-
formance Evaluations: Age and Disability Discrimination? 300 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2014). Similarly,
the outcomes of principals’ challenges to dismissals and other adverse employment actions were
largely in favor of the defendant districts.  Linda Mayger & Perry A. Zirkel, Principals’ Challenges
to Adverse Employment Actions: An Empirical Analysis of the Case Law, 98 NASSP BULL. 219
(2014).
49 See, e.g., Langlois & Colarusso, supra note 43, at 32.
50 See, e.g., C. EDWARD LAWRENCE, THE MARGINAL TEACHER 2-3 (2003); JESSICA LEVIN,
JENNIFER MULHERN, & JOAN SCHUNK, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: THE CASE FOR RE-
FORMING THE STAFFING RULES IN URBAN TEACHER CONTRACTS (2005), http://tntp.org/
publications/view/unintended-consequences-the-case-for-reforming-staffing-rules
51 See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, “Passing the Trash,” 92 PRINCIPAL 50 (Mar./Apr. 2013).  For
another more extreme example, which was limited to a couple of the largest cities and which
helped direct public attention to the issue of teacher terminations, see Susan Abram, Rubber
Rooms: LA Teachers Protest Against “Teacher Jails,” LOS ANGELES DAILY NEWS (Dec. 10, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tag/rubber-rooms/; Stephen Brill, The Rubber Room: The Battle
over New York City’s Worst Teachers, THE NEW YORKER (Aug, 31, 2009), http://www.newyorker
.com/reporting/2009/08/31/090831fa_fact_brill.
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than dismissal proceedings, including—whether truly voluntary52 or not53—
transfer, retirement, and resignation.54
Fourth, even if the administrators fully utilized the streamlined statutory
procedures to eliminate grossly ineffective teachers, the substantial overall dis-
parities between low-income and high-minority schools or students and their
mainstream counterparts will remain largely the same due to several other sys-
temic factors, including 1) the remaining segment of teachers who are moder-
ately or marginally ineffective,55 2) other significant issues of teacher quality,56
52 There is reason to suspect that at least some of the grossly ineffective teachers would leave
based on frustration in being so unsuccessful.  See, e.g., Richard M. Ingersoll, Why Do High-
Poverty Schools Have Difficulty Staffing Their Classrooms with High Quality Teachers?, http://
www.shankerinstitute.org/images/ASI-Talk-Oct-2014-Ingersoll.pdf  (reporting that high-pov-
erty schools have particularly high rates of attrition and that job dissatisfaction is the leading
reason).
53 The data tend to be anecdotal and informal based on the covertness of this strategy, but I
have on more than one occasion heard principals boasting about their success in effectuating
resignations of  teachers they perceived to be ineffective by making their working conditions
intolerable.
54 Menuey, supra note 47, at 315.  These strategies also included those that did not involve
exiting, such as successful remediation or voluntary switching to a different teaching assignment
in the school. Id.; see also Tucker, supra note 43 (finding that the typical principal in Virginia
with a staff of 100 teacher annually identifies 1.53 incompetent teachers and for them
remediates .68, encourages retirement or resignation for .37, reassigns .29, and recommends
dismissal for .10).
55 See, e.g., Bridges & Groves, supra note 46, at 11 (estimating that 11% of teachers were
unsatisfactory based on statewide survey of principals in 1985); Richard Ehrgott, Joan C. Hen-
derson-Sparks, & Richard K. Sparks, Marginal Teachers in California, available from the Educa-
tion Resources Information Center, Access No. ED356556 (Jan. 1993) (estimating that 10.8%
of teachers in California were marginal based on survey of school administrators in the early
1990s); Carolyn Lavely, Neal Berger, & John Follman, Actual Incidence of Incompetent Teachers,
15 EDUC. RES. Q. 11 (1992) (estimated that 10% of public school teachers in the U.S. are
incompetent based on a mix of early, state-based sources); Menuey, supra note 47, at 310 (esti-
mated that 5% of teachers are incompetent or marginal based on various earlier studies and
“gross disparity” from the dismissal rate).  Part of the problem in arriving at accurate estimates is
the imprecise definitions of such relative terms.  An overlapping part is their unclear or lack of
uniform reference frame—is it criterion-based or norm-referenced?
56 The identification of contributing factors depends in part on the specific definition of
teacher quality and similar terms, such as effectiveness or competency.  For example, in advocat-
ing for output-oriented policies, Hanushek provide this definition of teacher quality: “good
teachers are ones that get large gains in student achievement for their classes; bad teachers are
just the opposite.”  Eric A. Hanushek, Teacher Quality, in TEACHER QUALITY 1 (Lance T. Izumi
& M. Evers eds., 2002).  The recent development of value-added evaluation grapples with the
measurement issues in implementing such a seemingly simple definition.  See, e.g., Michael
Croft & Richard Buddin, Applying Value-Added Methods to Teachers in Untested Grades and Sub-
jects, 44 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (2015); Preston C. Green Bruce D. Baker & Joseph Oluwole, The Legal
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including recruitment and retention,57 3) various other, non-teacher factors,
and Policy Implications of Value-Added Teacher Assessment Policies, 2012 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1;
Mark A. Paige, A Legal Argument Against the Use of VAMs in Teacher Evaluation, TEACHERS C.
REC. (Dec. 21, 2014), http://www.tcrecord.org/Content.asp?ContentId=17796; Cassandra M.
Guarino et al., Policy and Research Challenges of Moving Toward Best Practices in Using Student
Test Scores to Evaluate Teacher Performance, 8 J. RES. EDUC. EFFECTIVENESS 1 (2015); June C.
Rivers & William L. Sanders, Teacher Quality and Equity in Educational Opportunities: Findings
and Policy Implications, in TEACHER QUALITY 13 (Lance T. Izumi & M. Evers eds., 2002);
Marcus I. Winters & Joshua M. Cowen, Who Would Stay, Would Be Dismissed?: An Empirical
Analysis of Value Added Teacher Retention Policies, 42 EDUC. RESEARCHER 330 (2013).
57 TARAH BETEILLE, DEMETRA KALOGRIDES, & SUSANNA LOEB, EFFECTIVE SCHOOLS:
MANAGING THE RECRUITMENT, DEVELOPMENT, AND RETENTION OF HIGH QUALITY TEACH-
ERS (2009), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1001428-effective-schools.pdf; THE
IRREPLACEABLES: UNDERSTANDING THE REAL RETENTION CRISIS IN AMERICA’S URBAN
SCHOOLS (2012), http://tntp.org/assets/documents/TNTP_Irreplaceables_2012.pdf; cf. SARAH
ALMY & MELISSA TOOLEY, BUILDING AND SUSTAINING TALENT: CREATING CONDITIONS IN
HIGH-POVERTY SCHOOLS THAT SUPPORT EFFECTIVE TEACHING AND LEARNING (June 2012),
http://www.edtrust.org/dc/publication/building-and-sustaining-talent-creating-conditions-in-
high-poverty-schools-that-suppo (concluding that “[d]espite widespread assumptions that
students are the primary cause of teacher dissatisfaction and attrition, research shows that the
work environment in schools — particularly the quality of school leadership and staff cohesion
— actually matters more, especially among teachers working in high-poverty schools”);
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, 2013 STATE TEACHER POLICY YEARBOOK:
NATIONAL SUMMARY (Jan. 2014), http://www.nctq.org/dmsStage/2013_State_Teacher_Policy_
Yearbook_National_Summary_NCTQ_Report (identifying exiting ineffective teachers as only
one of five critical factors in state teacher policies, with the others being delivering well-prepared
teachers, expanding the pool of teachers, identifying effective teachers, and retaining effective
teachers); NICOLE S. SIMON & SUSAN MOORE JOHNSON, TEACHER TURNOVER IN HIGH-
POVERTY SCHOOLS: WHAT WE KNOW AND CAN DO (2013), http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/
icb.topic1231814.files/Teacher%20Turnover%20in%20High-Poverty%20Schools.pdf (conclud-
ing that teachers leave high-poverty schools for positions in the suburbs due to poor working
conditions in terms of school leadership and collegial culture); cf. Steven Sawchuk, Steep Drop
Seen in Teacher-Prep Enrollment Numbers, EDUC. WK., Oct. 22, 2014, at 1 (attributing 10%
national decline in teacher education enrollments not only to the economic/employment situa-
tion but also the policy changes perceived as diminishing the status of teachers).  For other
significant teacher quality factors, see, e.g., David N. Figlio & Lawrence W. Kenney, Individual
Teacher Incentives and Student Performance, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 901 (2007) (finding that student
test scores are higher in schools that offer merit pay, particularly those with low parental over-
sight); Linda Darling Hammond, Teacher Quality and Student Achievement: A Review of State
Policy Evidence, 8 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1 (Jan. 2000) (concluding that teacher
preparation and certification are by far the strongest correlates with student achievement before
and after controlling for student poverty); Eric A. Hanushek, Teacher Quality, in Teacher Qual-
ity 1 (Lance T. Izumi & M. Evers eds., 2002) (advocating experimentation focused on incentive
measures for student-gain rather than input policies); Charles Taylor Kerchner, Even in Win-
ning, Vergara Is Still a Loser, EDUC. WK. blog, http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/on_california/
2014/06/even_in_winning_vergara_is_still_a_loser.html?qs=vergara (pointing out proposed
California legislation focus on professional development of teachers).
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such as effective leadership,58 equitable resources,59 and social injustice,60 and
4) the overlay of procedural and other security protection in teacher contracts
in collective bargaining jurisdictions.61
In conclusion, the Vergara decision is more significant symbolically than
legally.  Analyzed carefully and objectively, the real meaning of this decision is
not to abolish tenure.  Rather, the trial court’s decision serves as not only a
stimulus for “rebalancing”62 tenure to its original meaning of reasonable and
fair procedural due process but also a reminder of the overriding need for more
comprehensive and systematic reform.63   The fulcrum for such policymaking
ultimately is in the legislative, not the judicial branch, requiring powerful and
collaborative educational leadership and broad-based political will.64
58 See, e.g., ROBERT J. MARZANO, TIMOTHY WATERS, & BRIAN MCNULTY, SCHOOL LEAD-
ERSHIP THAT WORKS: FROM RESEARCH TO RESULTS (2005), available from the Education
Resources Information Center, Access No. ED509055.
59 See, e.g., Allan Alson & Elizabeth Nelson, Educational Impact of Resource Allocation Differ-
ences Between Suburban and Urban High Schools, 14 PUB. INT. L. REP. 242 (2009); Jay G.
Chambers, Jesse D. Levin, & Larisa Shambaugh, Exploring Weighted Student Formulas as a Policy
for Improving Equity for Distributing Resources to Schools: A Case Study of Two California School
Districts, 29 ECON. EDUC. REV. 283 (2010); Jaekyung Lee & Kenneth K. Wong, The Impact of
Accountability of Racial and Socioeconomic Equity: Considering Both School Resources and Student
Achievement, 41 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 797 (2004); see also Dear Colleague Letter (Oct. 1, 2014),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-resourcecomp-201410.pdf; cf.
Douglas B. Larson & Joseph O. Oluwole, The Opportunity Costs of Teacher Evaluation: A Labor
and Equity Analysis of the Teach-NJ Legislation, 308 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2014) (examining the
impact of such legislative reform on administrators’ time demands and inter-district inequities).
60 See, e.g., DANIEL DORLING, INJUSTICE: WHY SOCIAL INEQUALITY PERSISTS (2011); Gail
C. Furman & Carolyn M. Shields, How Can Educational Leaders Promote Social Justice and
Democratic Community in Schools, in A NEW AGENDA FOR RESEARCH IN EDUCATIONAL LEAD-
ERSHIP 119 (William A. Firestone & Carolyn Riehl eds., 2005).
61 See, e.g., LEVIN, MULHERN, & SCHUNK, supra note 50.
62 See, e.g., REBALANCING TEACHER TENURE: A POST-Vergara Guide for Policy Makers
(2013), http://tntp.org/publications/view/school-staffing-employment-policy/rebalancing-teach
er-tenure-a-post-vergara-guide-for-policymakers.  For the Education Commission of the States’
ongoing systematic snapshots of state laws for teacher dismissal and RIF, see http://www.ecs.org/
html/educationIssues/teachingQuality/teacherdb_intro.asp. For another synthesis of the ongoing
reform movement in state laws for teacher tenure and tenure evaluation, see Ann Blankenship,
Teacher Tenure: The Times, They Are a Changin’, 1 EDUC. L. & POL’Y REV. 193 (2014).
63 For the need for more comprehensive and systematic policymaking in related areas, see,
e.g., Erik A. Hanushek & Alfred A. Lindseth, Performance-Based Funding, EDUC. WK., June 10,
2008, at 20.
64 In her report on New York’s teacher dismissal legislation, Stevens, supra note 33, at 52,
argued that “while removing chronically ineffective teachers alone will not fix the problem, that’s
no reason not to do it. . ..  The aim is to protect children.”  However, the interest of protecting
children and providing them with competent teachers dictates corresponding revision of the
interrelated causes of this problem; there’s every reason to do it.
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